Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Q&A Question 2

Is distance eliminated or changed if I can see the suffering victims through the media or the internet?

In relation to Singer's argument and the argument for an emphatic ethics. The qualities of distance, that one cannot see or hear what is going on in a distant place, seem to be minimized by the media available to us that gives us indirect access to what is happening at a distance.

I think in ethics this is a relevant discussion. Especially when dealing with a sort of ethics that is based on the feelings on empathy. If you can get that 'distant' suffering right into your living room, is it that distant at all? So if there where an argument based on distance, this would need to be taken into account.

Q&A Question 1

If we accept Singer as true, will the application of massive aid actually relieve poverty?

I suppose this is a bit of a leading question on my part. But I think that this is a serious flaw in Singers argument. Will the application of aid do what it is supposed to do? Which is relieving suffering.

Then again there is the argument that is what is right is right. The act of saving a persons life right now is moral, and to hell with the consequences.

Sunday, February 19, 2012

Responding to "Is 'Owning' a Pet Ethical?"

From the title I thought the issue of 'owning' was what was going to be discussed. I think it is possible that the mode of 'being owned' is certainly immoral in humans. We will likely all agree that slavery is immoral.

So the question is then, is it moral to own animals? In our last class we discussed that just about every animal likely has the capacity for pleasure and pain, but if these can be provided for in the situation of ownership then there may be no immoral grounds for owning. But what about animals that exhibit signs of consciousnes?

Ownership implys that the subject of ownership is an object, and that it can be disposed of in whatever way the owner thinks fit. If we do think that animals are in a separate moral category from objects, we might want to look forward to a different mode of relationship that is more moral than owner and owned. For example, the treatment of pets in certain social contexts as a sort of part of the family, should be extended into the legal sphere, replacing ownership.

Monday, February 13, 2012

Q&A Question 2

-Does the abortion debate only hang on the issue of fetal person-hood?

The 'future like ours' argument could be construed as either they will be people or they are already people because they have the futures of people. Also a bit of a bad question because an issue can always be brought up.

My position on morality would actually ignore the thing itself. Since fetuses are not part of society the same way humans or animals are they need not be dealt with with any special moral considerations.

Q&A Question 1

-Where is the line between person-hood and being an animal, are there important qualities that overlap?

Ultimately the root of the the question of weather or not it is moral to kill/harm animals. It's already quite obvious that it is wrong to kill or harm a human, with certain exceptions of course.

I think the relevant difference is that they do not automatically invoke the same amount of empathy within us, the way we get from another human being. This may be a cultural convention. It may have been that in the past humans had no empathy fostered in them by their milieux and where more capable of harming and killing each other. The most relevant overlap is more metaphysical. The overlap is that they have the capacity to feel pain and, intuitively, I think that certain animals have 'consciousness' or some continuous experience of living comparable to human's.

The basis for my own argument for animal ethics is both that animals do have certain capacities that would seem to put them on a similar level of moral consideration as humans. Secondly, we would want to enforce the ethical treatment of animals because their mistreatment could inspire a lack of empathy and lead the animal abuser to be more comfortable with abusing humans.

Sunday, February 12, 2012

Singer

I will come out and say it, I think singer is right. His argument seems to me to be completely cogent and entirely reasonable. That being said, I do not think that his proposal will, in the long run, eliminate poverty and starvation.

I find the structural issues that cause wide spread poverty and starvation to be more immoral than the things themselves. That the world's economy marginalizes, and except in the case of exploitable resources, excludes the third world from the advances of man, because those third world populations are irrelevant to the world economy, to be morally unacceptable. This relies on a fragile ethical position, which is that it is the general movement of humanity, in its many abstract and ultimately meaningless endeavors, that lends meaning to the individual. If an individual or community is excluded from the greater movements of humanity that creates a void of meaning and relevance.

Saturday, February 11, 2012

Frey Oddly Stipulative

Frey's stipulative definition of the terms 'want' and 'desire' seems to me to take away from his argument. He stipulates by saying that he believes in wanting as in needing. Why don't we just say that animals can need but not desire?

In popular usage want and desire are used interchangeably, so by using these terms he accomplished confusing the issue a bit. Now is it true that animals only have needs but not desires? Frey says no, because desires can only be formed if one has belief's to form them with, and belief's can only be formed with language. Though I can not back this up, I think Frey will have a hard time proving that you absolutely cannot form beliefs without language.

Maybe he thinks that the quality of a declarative statement does not arise from a thought behind the language but rather from the structure of the language itself. My intuition says that language should not be confused with though, and while language and thought are related, the mind can deal with mental objects and have beliefs without using language.